Entity

This article is about the broad concept of an entity. For other uses, see Entity (disambiguation).

An entity is something that exists as itself. It does not need to be of material existence. In particular, abstractions and legal fictions are usually regarded as entities. In general, there is also no presumption that an entity is animate, or present. The verb tense of this form is to 'entitize' - meaning to convert into an entity; to perceive as tangible or alive.

The term is broad in scope and may refer to animals; natural features such as mountains; inanimate objects such as tables; numbers or sets as symbols written on a paper; human contrivances such as laws, corporations and academic disciplines; or supernatural beings such as gods and spirits.

The adjectival form is entitative.

Definition

An entity is something that exists, such as a material object or living being. Entities are often regarded as having separate or independent existence, each with its own identity and distinct from other entities. In its broadest sense, the concept encompasses all identifiable items. This can include inanimate everyday objects, people, events, places, ideas, relations, facts, universal entities such as the color red, abstract objects such as the number 7, and collective entities such as sets. Accordingly, the concept entity is often treated as the broadest category of being, covering everything that is or could be. Some definitions provide narrower characterizations that require additional conditions, for example, that entities are stable, have clear boundaries, are indivisible, or serve as distinct objects that can be counted.

Entities contrast with nonentities, although it is controversial to what this concept applies. Suggested examples of nonentities include voids, emptiness, nothingness, and absences, such as holes or shadows. Similarly, philosophers debate whether nonexistent objects, such as the winged horse Pegasus, should be regarded as entities. Another set of challenges comes from parts or aspects of reality that are not clearly identifiable, for example because they lack exact boundaries or cannot be precisely distinguished from other entities. The terms reification and hypostatization can denote the practice of treating a nonentity as if it were an entity.

The English word entity has its roots in the Latin term ens, meaning 'being'. It gave rise to the Latin word entitas and was subsequently adopted into French as the term entité. The French word was borrowed into English in the 16th century, with the earliest known use in 1596 in a work by Thomas Bell.

Related concepts

The terms object, thing, and being are commonly used as synonyms of entity. However, they carry distinct connotations and are sometimes used differently.

An object is something toward which thought, perception, or intention is directed. In a broad sense, objects encompass all items apprehended, imagined, or referred to, including not only physical objects but also fictional ones without real counterparts, such as unicorns. In a narrower sense, the term is sometimes limited to material entities that can be perceived by the senses. A common distinction contrasts objects with subjects. It holds that while objects are grasped in consciousness, they do not possess it: an object is an it that can appear in someone's consciousness, whereas a subject is a self that acts as a center of consciousness.

Understood broadly, a thing is any item whose existence is acknowledged, including but not limited to material bodies. In this regard, the word thing is the broadest countable noun, reflecting the slogan "everything is a thing". However, the term is also used in more restricted ways to denote an individual entity in contrast to the properties it has or the relations it bears to other things. In this sense, a car is a thing, whereas its shape, color, and weight are features or aspects rather than things in their own right. In everyday discourse, the term thing is often used for inanimate objects, such as rocks or chairs, contrasting with living creatures, such as humans and other animals.

When used as a countable noun, the expression a being overlaps with that of an entity, denoting something that exists. However, being is also used as an uncountable noun, referring to the fact that something is, to existence as such, or to the totality of reality. The distinction between being and beings played a central role in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who termed it the ontological difference. He argued that being constitutes the background context that makes all individual beings intelligible, insisting that being is not itself an individual being. Traditionally, being is contrasted with becoming. In this sense, being denotes stable or permanent aspects of reality, whereas becoming covers changes and processes.

Types

Many types of entities are discussed in the academic discourse. Different classifications may overlap, and it is controversial whether all proposed categories represent genuine entities.

Particular and universal

Particulars are individual entities: they are unique and non-repeatable. They contrast with universals, which are general and repeatable entities. For example, the philosopher Socrates, the Great Pyramid of Giza, and the planet Mars are particular entities, whereas the color blue, the shape of a square, and the property of being a flower are universal entities. A key difference is that each particular exists as an individual instance, whereas universals can have multiple instances and be present in several locations at the same time. Universals can express repeatable aspects of particulars. For example, the particulars Mars and Jupiter are both characterized by the universal of being a planet. According to a common view, particulars instantiate universals but are not themselves instantiated by anything else.

Universals are frequently understood in terms of properties and relations. A property is an entity that expresses a quality or feature of another entity. For example, the property being-tall is a feature of the Empire State Building. A relation is an entity that expresses how several things stand to each other. For instance, the relation being-taller-than is an entity that characterizes how the Empire State Building stands to the White House. Although properties are typically treated as universal entities that can have multiple instances, an alternative approach treats them as particulars, called tropes, regarding each individual instance as a separate entity.

Various metaphysical debates address the reality of universals, asking whether they exist as genuine entities. Platonic realists assert that universals can exist independently of particulars, while moderate realists hold that they exist only when instantiated by particulars. Conceptualists maintain that universals exist only in the minds of individuals as conceptual entities but not in mind-independent reality, whereas nominalists deny that universals in either form are real.

Concrete and abstract

Concrete entities are things that exist in space and time. They can undergo changes, causally interact with other entities, and be perceived or measured, either directly or indirectly. They contrast with abstract entities, which have no physical location or temporal duration. Accordingly, abstract entities do not undergo changes, do not causally interact with other entities, and are not accessible to sensory perception. For example, a tree, a house, and an earthquake are concrete entities, whereas the number 7, the empty set, and the proposition "snow is white" are abstract entities.

Concrete entities can be distinguished by the field of inquiry that studies them, including physical, biological, psychological, and social entities, such as a rock, a bird, an idea, and a financial institution, respectively. According to one view, the different domains belong to distinct levels of reality. This outlook suggests that higher-level entities emerge from lower-level entities, depend on them, and show new forms of organization, as in the claim that mental states emerge from physical brains.

While the existence of concrete entities is widely accepted, it is controversial whether abstract entities are genuine constituents of reality. Proponents argue that abstract entities are indispensable to scientific descriptions of the world and that many domains of discourse refer to them as if they were distinct entities. Opponents question in what sense entities outside spacetime and without causal relationships could exist, and how humans, who are themselves concrete entities, could know about them.

Independent and dependent

Independent entities exist on their own without relying on other entities. They contrast with dependent entities, which require other entities or are grounded in them. Philosophical discussions concern whether there are dependent entities in addition to independent ones, and which entities fall under each category. For example, one view identifies independent entities with substances, conceived as particulars that underlie and support properties and relations. On this view, substantial entities such as a tomato are independent, whereas their features are dependent, such as the idea that the redness of a tomato depends on the tomato because it inheres in the tomato. A different suggestion holds that macroscopic objects encountered in everyday life, such as chairs, are dependent on the microscopic objects, such as the elementary particles that constitute them.

The contrast between independent and dependent entities overlaps with that between major and minor entities. Major entities are regarded as having a more substantial or robust existence, such as material objects and events. They contrast with minor entities, which are considered subordinate in some sense, such as surfaces, holes, and shadows. For example, the surface of an apple has one spatial dimension less than the apple and cannot exist without the apple, making it less substantial. Similarly, a hole in a cheese or a shadow cast by a person is regarded as less robust since it involves an absence of matter or light rather than a positive physical presence. Absences are also called negative entities, and it is controversial whether they should be regarded as genuine but dependent entities or as nonentities.

Possible, actual, and necessary

Possible entities, or possibilia, are things that could exist. For example, Santa Claus, understood as a jolly, white-bearded inhabitant of the North Pole, is a possible entity. Actual entities are entities that actually exist, such as King Charles III. In the broadest sense, every actual entity is also a possible entity since actual existence implies possible existence. However, the term possible entity is often used more narrowly to refer to merely possible entities, which lack actual existence. Necessary entities are actual entities that not only exist but could not have failed to exist, making their existence inevitable. It is controversial whether there are any necessary entities and, if so, which entities qualify as necessary. Suggested examples include abstract entities and God. Actual entities that are not necessary are called contingent entities: they exist but could have failed to exist.

The distinction between possible, actual, and necessary entities is often discussed in terms of possible worlds—ways how things could have been. According to this view, an entity is possible if it exists in at least one possible world, actual if it exists in the actual world, and necessary if it exists in all possible worlds.

Various metaphysical theories address the reality of possible entities. Actualism is the view that only actual entities are genuine objects. According to this view, there are no non-actual possible entities, for example, because statements about possible entities are analyzed as claims about actual things, such as actual fictions or ideas. Possibilism, by contrast, regards non-actual possible entities as genuine entities, as real as actual ones. Some discussions also address the reality or non-reality of impossible entities, which are proposed entities that could not exist because they have contradictory features, such as a round square.

Others

The contrast between observable and unobservable entities pertains to the empirical sciences. Observable entities are things that humans can directly perceive under the right circumstances, such as cats and traffic lights. They contrast with unobservable or theoretical entities, such as electrons and wave functions, which cannot be directly perceived. Scientists often posit unobservable entities in their theories to explain why observable phenomena occur or how they behave. It is controversial whether unobservable entities should be regarded as genuine constituents of reality. Scientific realism holds that the best scientific theories provide an accurate description of reality and are either exactly or at least approximately true. Entity realism, a specific form of scientific realism, holds that only certain unobservable entities are real: those with which scientists can causally interact to produce effects through experimental manipulation. Instrumentalism is a different view that opposes scientific realism. It holds that scientific theories are tools for making predictions about observable reality without commitments to the existence of unobservable entities.

Fictional entities are things that are represented in works of fiction. For example, the hobbit Frodo is a fictional character in J. R. R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings; a flying carpet is a fictional object in the folktales One Thousand and One Nights; and Tatooine is a fictional place in the Star Wars saga. Fictional entities are closely related to intentional objects—entities towards which mental states, such as thoughts or perceptions, are directed. For instance, when a person thinks about Bigfoot then Bigfoot is the intentional object of the thought. Similarly, conceptual entities are mental constructions apprehended by reason and manipulated in cognitive processes, such as the mental representation of a total additional velocity introduced by a physicist to analyze how the motion of a body changes.

Facts are entities that express what is the case, often understood as correlates of true statements. They are typically analyzed as complex entities with an internal structure reflecting the objects, properties, and relations they involve. According to this view, the fact "the Moon is round" is made up of the object the Moon and the property roundness. Events are entities that occur in time, such as the first Moon landing.

Principles and theories

Identity and quantification

Identity expresses that two things are the same, either numerically or qualitatively. Numerical identity is a relation that every entity has only to itself and to no distinct entity. For example, the morning star is numerically identical to the evening star since both terms refer to the same object: the planet Venus. Qualitative identity, or indiscernibility, is a relation between entities that have the same features and resemble each other in every respect, such as perfect identical twins. The indiscernibility of identicals is a widely accepted principle stating that numerical identity implies the absence of qualitative differences. The converse principle, the identity of indiscernibles, is more controversial: it suggests that if entities have no qualitative differences, then they are numerically identical, implying that two distinct entities cannot have exactly the same properties.

Numerical identity is typically regarded as a central aspect of entities, reflected in the principle "no entity without identity". This proposed principle expresses the idea that something should not be treated as a genuine entity if there is in principle no way to determine whether it is identical to or distinct from something else. The way of determining this is called criterion of identity or principle of individuation. The ability to determine identity and difference is central for acquiring objective knowledge about the world, for example, when comparing observations made at different times, assessing whether statements by different people concern the same thing, and combining information from reports that describe the same object in different ways. Different types of entities can have different criteria of identity. For example, mathematical sets are identical if they have the same members, whereas one account of the identity conditions of events holds that events are identical if they have the same causes and effects. For various types of entities, it is controversial what their criteria of identity are, or whether they have determinate criteria of identity at all.

The problem of identity conditions includes diachronic identity, which is about the same entity at different times: it concerns the question of how, or under what conditions, entities persist through time while remaining the same. For example, the Ship of Theseus is a thought experiment about a ship whose parts are gradually replaced until no original component remains, raising the question of whether it is still the same ship. Diachronic identity contrasts with synchronic identity, which relates an entity to itself at the same time.

Identity plays a key role in quantification, which concerns how entities are counted to determine how many there are. Some quantifiers provide only general assessments, such as some and all, which indicate whether something exists at least once or applies to all entities within a domain. Others express more specific conditions, such as between four and seven or exactly eleven. Identity is often regarded as a requirement for quantification, reflecting the idea that entities can only be counted if it is possible to distinguish one individual from another. However, there may be cases where the two can come apart: one suggested case involves quantum systems, such as a helium atom with two electrons, where it may be impossible to distinguish one electron from the other, although one can determine that exactly two electrons are present.

Composition and constitution

Composition is a relation between a whole and its parts. Many entities encountered in everyday life are complex objects composed of several parts. For example, a table is made up of a tabletop and legs. Parts may themselves be composed of smaller parts, such as the molecules that comprise the tabletop.

Mereology is the field studying composition. It examines the theories and underlying principles of the part-whole relation, including the conditions under which a collection of parts may be considered a whole. According to mereological universalism, there are no limiting conditions: any collection of entities comprises a whole, such as a whole consisting of a rusty bicycle, a beaver, and a moon of Jupiter. This view is rejected by mereological moderatism, which holds that there are some limitations. For example, one suggested condition is that the parts of a whole need to be in physical contact with each other. Mereological nihilism denies that wholes exist as genuine entities. According to this view, there are no composite entities with proper parts. A related discussion addresses the existence of simple or indivisible material entities, which have no proper parts. Atomism asserts that such entities exist, whereas continuum theorists hold that everything is infinitely divisible, meaning that every entity, no matter how small, is itself composed of smaller parts.

Composition is closely related to material constitution, the relation between a material object and the matter of which it is composed. For example, if a lump of clay is formed into a statue then the lump constitutes the statue. According to one view, material constitution is the same as identity, meaning that the lump and the statue are the same entity. One difficulty for this view is that the lump existed before the statue and can survive the statue's destruction, suggesting that they are not identical because they have different properties.

Boundaries

The boundary of an entity separates it from its environment. Boundaries mark where one thing ends and another begins: all parts of an entity lie within its boundaries, and none lie beyond them. Boundaries typically apply to concrete entities, such as the surface of a cherry acting as the fruit's spatial boundary and a person's birth and death dates acting as the temporal boundaries of their life. In the broadest sense, the concept has also been applied to abstract entities, such as the boundary of a set of points in geometry.

Philosophers debate whether boundaries are genuine entities, often construed as lower-dimensional objects. This view is opposed by eliminativism, which regards boundaries as mere abstractions or aspects of bounded entities rather than entities in their own right. A further philosophical challenge comes from vague boundaries, for which no sharp demarcation separating the inside of an entity from its outside can be identified, such as clouds, mountains, and historical events like the Industrial Revolution. According to one view, this difficulty is not limited to certain objects but concerns reality in general. This perspective holds that reality is a single integrated and continuous whole. It maintains that commonly accepted entities lack genuine existence since they result from arbitrarily imposed boundaries grounded in human cognition rather than in mind-independent divisions inherent in the structure of reality itself.

Realism and anti-realism

Realism and anti-realism debate the existence of mind-independent entities. In the broadest sense, realism holds that there is an external world and that the entities within it exist the way they do, regardless of how people perceive or think about them. Anti-realism, by contrast, maintains that reality depends on human consciousness or mental processes, for example, because it is shaped by conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, or the inborn cognitive structure of the mind.

Discussions between realists and anti-realists often focus on specific types of entities rather than on reality in general. For example, realism about universals holds that universals are genuine entities in their own right rather than mere conceptual constructions. Similar debates address the existence of abstract objects, moral facts, values, and unobservable entities.

Others

Discussions about the existence of entities often invoke the concept ontological commitment. An ontological commitment of a theory is an entity that exists according to this theory. For example, theism affirms God's existence, resulting in an ontological commitment to God. An influential but controversial way of analyzing ontological commitments was proposed by Willard Van Orman Quine. He proposed that by translating a theory into first-order logic, its ontological commitments are revealed by quantified statements that cannot be true unless the entities they describe exist.

Ockham's razor is a methodological principle for constructing theories or choosing between alternative explanations by assessing their ontological commitments. It holds that theories with the fewest ontological commitments, positing the smallest number of entities, are preferable. It follows the idea that "entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity", resulting in a preference for simple theories that require few assumptions.

The discussion between existence pluralism, existence monism, and existence nihilism concerns the number of concrete entities that exist. Existence pluralism is the widely accepted view that reality is made up of multiple concrete entities. It aligns with the common-sense view of reality that the things people encounter in everyday life, such as cars and plants, are distinct entities. Existence monism challenges this perspective by contending that there is only a single concrete entity: the world as a whole. According to this outlook, the different items encountered in everyday life are not genuine entities but merely aspects or features of the single world object. Existence nihilism, another controversial view, argues that there are no concrete entities, neither everyday objects nor the world as a whole. One version holds that there is only undifferentiated stuff, while another argues that reality is composed of a multiplicity of features. On these accounts, neither stuff nor a multiplicity of features qualify as genuine entities.

The principle of sufficient reason is the view that nothing is without a reason. It holds that for every entity, there is a sufficient reason explaining why it exists. For example, if there is an explosion in a warehouse, the principle states that there must be an explanation for why the explosion occurred. There are disagreements about whether the principle is true and to which parts of reality it applies. In its broadest sense, it covers not only concrete entities but also abstract ones, such as explanations of mathematical truths. The principle is closely associated with rationalism and the idea that the world is thoroughly intelligible without brute or unexplainable facts.

In philosophy

Main article: Ontology

Ontology is the study of concepts of existence, and of recognition of entities. The words ontic and entity are derived respectively from the ancient Greek and Latin present participles that mean "being".

In an ontic inquiry... one asks about the properties or the physical relations and structures peculiar to some entity – in the pen's case, for example, we might make the following ontic observations about it: it is black, full of blue ink, and sitting on top of my desk.

In law, politics, economics, accounting

Main articles: Legal person and Polity

In law, a legal entity is an entity that is capable of bearing legal rights and obligations, such as a natural person or an artificial person (e.g. business entity or a corporate entity).

In politics, entity is used as term for territorial divisions of some countries (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In economics, economic entity is one of the assumptions made in generally accepted accounting principles. Almost any type of organization or unit in society can be an economic entity.

In accounting, the entity concept is the concept that a business or an organization and its owners are treated as two separate parties.

In medicine

Main article: Medicine

In medicine, a disease entity is an illness due to a particular definite cause or to a specific pathological process. While a disease entity is not defined by a syndrome, it may or may not be manifest in one or more particular syndromes.

In computer science

Further information: Entity–relationship model and Entity–control–boundary

In computer science, an entity is an object that has an identity, which is independent of the changes of its attributes. It represents long-lived information relevant for the users and is usually stored in a database.

See also

• Digital identity
• Elementary entity
• Entity–relationship model
• Entity–control–boundary
• Entity realism, a form of scientific realism
• Entitativity
• Everything
• Html entity
• Non-physical entity
• Object (philosophy)
• Circular reference

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External links

• Media related to Entities at Wikimedia Commons
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